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A cornerstone of industrial relations theory is the idea that the
potential for conflict is inherent in the employment relationship.
Across countries, forms of workplace conflict and methods of con-
flict resolution take a range of different forms. Yet aside from
attempts to understand cross-national variation in strikes, little
research has examined systemic differences in the manifestation
and management of workplace conflict. The authors seek to fill this
void by analyzing through a comparative lens practices for addres-
sing employment-related conflict in four countries: Germany, the
United States, Italy, and Australia. In contrast to the unidimensional
varieties of capitalism approach, they analyze workplace conflict res-
olution systems across two dimensions: collective-individual and
regulated-voluntarist. The analysis also emphasizes the importance
of within-country variation and interactions between different con-
flict resolution subsystems.
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A well-established fact is that within developed economies we find
different IR systems, clustering along dimensions such as 1) the degree of
centralization/decentralization of collective bargaining, 2) systems with
strong or weak state-involvement, 3) the division of interest representation
in single- and dual-channel systems, 4) the nature of union identity, and 5)
multi- versus single-union confederation systems or systems with or without
board-level representation of workers, to name just a few. In general,
national systems of interest representation and collective bargaining have
been analyzed quite comprehensively, but we know much less about cross-
national variation in the mechanisms for addressing work and employment-
related disputes.
In this article we will seek to advance understanding of comparative work-
place dispute resolution by looking at two general issues. First, we investi-
gate specific dispute resolution practices and institutions in the four
countries of interest and seek to understand the variation among them.
Second, we explore the linkages between practices and institutions within
each of the countries and analyze the nature of complementarity in their
systems of workplace dispute resolution.
Our classification of practices and institutions for dispute resolution is
informed by decades of scholarship on comparative IR (Kerr, Harbison,
Dunlop, and Myers 1960; Frege and Kelly 2013; Bamber et al. 2016; Baccaro
and Howell 2017). While this research is diverse in its own right, the degree
of state involvement and the level of centralization are two key dimensions
that have frequently been used to classify national systems of employment
relations. We build on this literature in our analysis of systems for workplace
dispute resolution by looking at two related dimensions.
The first dimension examines the importance of state-level actors for
resolving conflict. At one extreme, national patterns might be subject to
intense regulation (and intervention) by public authorities—be it the state
and its agencies or the court system. At the opposite end of the continuum,
patterns might be dominated by private or voluntary procedures, whereby
individuals or collective actors address conflict free of interference from
public authorities. We refer to this as the regulated-voluntarist dimension.
In the second dimension, the analysis explores whether conflict is to be
addressed at the individual or collective level. We assume that conflict might
be addressed individually by single employees and employers themselves or
through collective actors such as unions, works councils, employers’ associa-
tions, or alternative dispute resolution bodies. We refer to this as the
collective-individual dimension.
In comparing the four countries across these two dimensions, we test the
assumption in the varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature of two dominant
archetypes, liberal market economies (LME) and coordinated market
economies (CME) (Hall and Soskice 2001), and question whether this
approach accurately describes cross-national variation in conflict resolution
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systems. We also depart from the VoC approach of emphasizing integrated,
coherent national employment relations systems.
We also test the argument advanced more recently by Baccaro and
Howell (2017) that IR systems in advanced industrialized countries are
undergoing a convergence in a neoliberal direction. Although their analysis
differs from the VoC perspective in arguing against the resilience of
national institutions in the face of change, the authors also focus on
national-level systems. They further argue that the common direction of
institutional movement across countries is toward a neoliberal approach,
which accords greater discretion to employers in the context of decentral-
ized IR.
By contrast, our analysis explores various sets of institutions and practices
within national systems that comprise distinct subsystems for conflict resolu-
tion. In doing so, we seek to identify the interactions between these subsys-
tems and to explain how they relate to institutional change within national
systems. The picture we draw is a more complex and messier one than
either the CME/LME dichotomy posited in the VoC perspective or the con-
vergence in a neoliberal trajectory posited by Baccaro and Howell (2017).
Using case studies, the article compares the four countries selected across
the CME/LME dichotomy. Included are Germany and the United States,
which are commonly used as the exemplars of the CME and LME models,
respectively. Australia, which is also generally classified within the LME
model, provides variation in the regulatory structure as compared with the
United States. Similarly, including Italy in the analysis allows us to examine
a country that, although not clearly on the CME side, belongs to those with
higher coordination capacities than the LME, albeit of a substantially differ-
ent nature from those of the German case. Italy also provides a second
country on the CME side, but one that differs substantially from Germany
in its regulatory structure. These four countries provide us with cases that,
at least a priori, we would expect to each be oriented to a different one of
the four quadrants in our framework (see Figure 1). These quadrants are
collective-regulated (Germany), collective-voluntarist (Italy), individual-
regulated (Australia), and individual-voluntarist (United States). That the
countries have distinct national systems also allows us to examine the
Baccaro and Howell (2017) hypothesis of convergence on a neoliberal tra-
jectory. If their argument is correct, we would expect to see our four cases
in the process of becoming more similar and characterized by more individ-
ualism and less regulation.
Framework for the Analysis
Conducting a comparative analysis requires us to define what will be com-
pared. Our general focus is on comparing systems for resolving workplace
conflict, specifically in the private sector. In many countries, workplace con-
flicts in the public and private sectors are handled through different systems
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because of the need to maintain essential public services and because of
issues concerning the scope of governmental authority versus collective bar-
gaining and other employment relations processes. Although of clear inter-
est, the complex issues regarding workplace conflict resolution in the public
sector are beyond the scope of this article. Although systems for workplace
conflict resolution often differ between unionized and non-union work-
places, this analysis examines conflict resolution in both of these types.
Indeed, one of our themes will be the interactions between subsystems
focused primarily on the unionized sector versus those focused on the non-
union sector or encompassing both sectors. Another common distinction in
the conflict resolution literature is between interest disputes, which involve
issues relating to the formation of labor and employment contracts, and
rights disputes, which concern issues relating to the application or enforce-
ment of these contracts. This analysis examines systems focused on each of
these disputes, as well as some systems that encompass both interest and
rights disputes.
Given the substantial variation that exists between national systems, an
initial analytical problem is to identify common features that we can exam-
ine in each of our case studies. Previous accounts of workplace dispute reso-
lution systems have focused on various aspects, or pillars, of such systems.
We concentrate on four such pillars.
The first pillar is the set of parties to the conflict. Traditionally in the
labor relations field, the focus has been on labor and management as the
key parties to conflict. However, countries have become increasingly diverse
in how they constitute these parties. Is labor organized collectively or
individually? Is management decentralized at the establishment level, acting
at the firm level, or organized collectively through employers’ associations?
The second pillar is the nature of the conflict between the parties. Are
disputes mainly about wages and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment? Are the operational and strategic decisions of the organization part
of the terrain of labor-management conflict or restricted to unilateral
Figure 1. Framework for Comparing Dispute Resolution Systems
Collective Individual
Regulated Germany Australia
Voluntarist Italy United States
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managerial authority? To what extent are disputes over employee rights a
central manifestation of labor-management conflict?
The third pillar is the process of conflict resolution. What types of dispute
resolution procedures are used to resolve conflicts between labor and man-
agement? Procedures may involve public mechanisms, such as labor courts
and employment tribunals. Alternative dispute resolution procedures such
as arbitration and mediation are used in many systems. In some countries,
private adjustment of disputes through negotiated or organizationally estab-
lished procedures are important.
The fourth pillar is the source and role of power in the system.
Bargaining power is a central construct in labor relations theory. In analyz-
ing dispute resolution systems, it is important to identify and account for
the sources of power for the parties in the system. How is labor able to bring
pressure on management to achieve its goals in resolving conflicts? How is
management able to resist pressure from labor? What is the source of
authority and power for neutrals seeking to resolve disputes?
We build on these key pillars—the parties to conflict, subjects of conflict,
conflict resolution processes, and power relations—to describe our four dif-
ferent national systems of conflict resolution. We then extend this analysis
by comparing these systems cross-nationally along two axes: the regulated-
voluntarist dimension and the collective-individual dimension.
The regulated-voluntarist dimension captures variation in the role of
state versus private actors in the system, thus giving center stage to the par-
ties of conflict as well as the power relations between the parties involved.
On the regulated end of this axis, we find systems that feature a more direct
role for state actors as key actors in the resolution of work disputes, such as
the use of public tribunals to resolve disputes. Public agencies in regulated
systems are often important actors in dealing with specific work disputes,
rather than just serving to establish the ground rules for the system.
Building on the sovereignty of the state provides such agencies with substan-
tial power resources as well as an effective means to enforce their decisions.
By contrast, in systems on the voluntarist end of the spectrum, private par-
ties are the main actors in the system, developing their own dispute resolu-
tion processes with only limited or indirect involvement from state actors.
The collective-individual dimension captures the degree to which work
disputes are individualized, thus involving the pillars of parties to and sub-
jects of conflict. Work disputes typically involve only one employee or a
small group as key parties, or are collectivized and involve employees acting
as a group through unions, works councils, or other structures. In addition
to reflecting how labor is or is not organized as an actor in the system, the
collective-individual dimension reflects the nature of the conflicts being
resolved. In more collective systems, work disputes typically concern con-
flicts over issues such as the implementation of collective agreements nego-
tiated by unions or other collective groups of employees. By contrast, in
more individualized systems, conflicts increasingly involve disputes over
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general employment rights that are often established by legislation and that
belong to the individual employee rather than to a collective group of
employees.
Put together, these two dimensions provide us with the comparative
framework within which we will analyze our four cases. The framework is
presented graphically in Figure 1.
From what we know about our four IR systems, we predict that the Italian
and US cases will be more voluntaristic, as state influence in labor relations
is considered to be comparatively weak (see, for example, Locke 1995; Katz,
Kochan, and Colvin 2017). By contrast, labor relations in Germany and
Australia are considered to be more regulated, with the strong influence of
the famous Award-system in Australia and statutes as well as court decisions
in Germany (see, for example, Wright and Lansbury 2016; Keller and
Kirsch 2016). Despite these similarities, which lead us to place the regulated
pair of Germany and Australia into the upper cells of Figure 1 and the
voluntaristic pair of Italy and the United States into the lower two cells, our
two country-pairs also have to be classified along the collective-individual
dimension. With the dominant role played by unions and employers’ asso-
ciations in Italy and Germany, these two countries share common ground
in being more collectivist and can be located in the left (collective) side of
Figure 1. In Australia and the United States, labor and employment rela-
tions are more individualized. Therefore, we would expect workplace con-
flict and conflict resolution to be more focused on the individual level
(Colvin and Darbishire 2013), placing this pair of countries in the right-
hand cells of Figure 1. We will investigate whether this classification based
on their general systems of labor and employment relations also holds for
systems of conflict resolution.
Beyond the analysis of different national-level practices or institutions, we
know very little about how they are interconnected at the national or sub-
national level. Do they take the shape of distinct, coherent national systems
or, alternatively, do different sub-national procedures or systems operate
independently to address particular types of conflict? How do sub-national
procedures or systems interact with each other and do they do so in a way
that enhances or reinforces the combined national system?
While some scholarship has forcefully made the case for national IR insti-
tutions or ‘‘varieties’’ (Hall and Soskice 2001), this view has been challenged
by observations of prevailing—if not increasing—within-country variation
(Katz and Darbishire 2000). In analyzing dispute resolution practices in the
four country case studies, we also seek to investigate to what degree national
practices are linked to each other, thereby forming national patterns based
on institutional complementarities. Such complementarities can take the
shape of two forms. Supplementarity, the first form, emerges when one
institution makes up for the deficiencies of the other (Crouch 2005).
Synergy, the second form, touches on the ‘‘mutually reinforcing effects of
compatible incentive structures in different subsystems of the economy’’
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(Deeg 2005: 3). We will investigate the extent of supplementarity and
synergy in conflict resolution practices in each of the four countries.
We next present our four national case studies: Germany, the United
States, Italy, and Australia. For each case, we describe the main workplace
conflict resolution subsystems of that country. The descriptions are orga-
nized using our two-dimensional framework, beginning with collective-
regulated and collective-voluntary subsystems, followed by individual-
regulated and individual-voluntary systems. None of the four countries
include subsystems in all four of these quadrants; the case studies describe
the major subsystems in each country.
Germany
Much of German labor relations has been characterized by ‘‘juridification,’’
a term that refers to a dense web of statutory rules and procedures that
restricts the behavior of key collective actors in an effort to reduce levels of
conflict at work (Keller 2008: 66–67). While juridification certainly empha-
sizes the regulated dimension of conflict resolution, within the second
dimension of our analysis—individual versus collective—outcomes turn out
to be more diverse. As will be shown in this section, certain elements of the
German conflict resolution system leave room for individual action whereas
other parts are heavily dominated by collective actors.
At the heart of the German system of conflict resolution is the ‘‘dual sys-
tem’’ of interest representation. This system ensures that workers’ interests
are represented through collective bargaining conducted between trade
unions and employers’ associations (or single employers), above the com-
pany level on the one hand and at the plant level through establishment-
level works councils on the other hand. While employees are free to address
legal claims arising from their employment contract in a well-developed sys-
tem of public labor courts, a major focus of the German system of dispute
resolution is at the collective level and involves unions, works councils,
employers, and employers’ associations as key actors (Behrens 2014).
Collective-Regulated Subsystem: Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining is the responsibility of unions and employers’ associa-
tions. Agreements are mostly negotiated for an entire industry within a cer-
tain region (in most cases this is one of the 16 German states [La¨nder]).
The German Collective Bargaining Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz), however, also
allows for company-level agreements to be negotiated between a union and
management. While the framework for collective bargaining is provided for
by both statute and the German Constitution—the latter guaranteeing the
famous concept of ‘‘collective bargaining autonomy’’ free of government
interference—collective bargaining dispute resolution boards are, if created
at all, to be voluntarily created by unions and employer associations (Weiss
2012: 805–6).
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The majority of multi-employer agreements are negotiated between one
of the approximately 700 employers’ associations and one of the eight affili-
ates of the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB). Most of the
employers’ associations are directly or indirectly affiliated with the
Confederation of German Employers (BDA). In 2017, 57% of all employees
in West Germany and 44% in East Germany were covered by a collective
agreement (Ellguth and Kohaut 2018: 300).
Conflict in the area of collective bargaining takes the shape of strikes and
lockouts, both of which are guaranteed by the German Constitution. While
no designated law regulates strikes in Germany, several standards and
restrictions have been established by major decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) and the Federal Labour
Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht). Among other standards, the courts have estab-
lished that strikes are to be called by a union. Strikes are only legal to pur-
sue a goal that could be regulated by a collective agreement (implying that
political strikes are considered to be illegal) and when a collective agree-
ment has expired or when no agreement exists (on a particular subject).
Compared with other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries, strike activity in Germany is rather moder-
ate and lockouts are very rare (Vandaele 2016: 280).
While there is no mandatory mediation/conciliation of collective bar-
gaining disputes in Germany, several multi-employer agreements include
voluntary mediation agreements (Schlichtungsabkommen), for example, agree-
ments for the construction industry and the public sector (Behrens 2014:
368). Collectively agreed-upon procedures frequently establish a mediation
committee, which usually consists of an equal number of representatives
from the union and the employers’ side with a neutral chair having the cast-
ing vote.
Collective-Regulated Subsystem: Establishment-Level Interest
Representation
Works councils (WC), according to the Works Constitution Act (WCA), can
be formed in establishments with more than five employees elected by the
entire workforce (rather than just by union members). They represent
workers’ day-to-day interests in areas such as hiring, transfers, dismissals,
company restructuring, and discipline but also in work organization, work-
ing time regulation, and overtime work. The WCA also imposes limits on
the scope of works council activities. In particular, works councils are not
allowed to either bargain collectively (WCA, Section 77 III) or call a strike
(WCA, Section 74 II). In 2017, 40% of all West German employees in estab-
lishments with more than five employees were represented by a works coun-
cil. In East Germany, only 33% of all employees were covered (Ellguth and
Kohaut 2018: 303).
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Employees are entitled to address individual grievances directly to the
employer or to the works council, but the most common dispute resolution
procedure at the establishment level is the arbitration panel. Such panels
are mostly used to resolve collective-level conflict between works councils
and management. For conflicts that involve matters in which works councils
enjoy statutory co-determination rights (not just information or consultation
rights), the arbitration procedures can be activated by one side—either the
WC or the employer. Panels are composed of an equal number of works
council and employer representatives, as well as a neutral chair (Behrens
2007: 180). In practice, the chair is usually a professional judge from the
local labor court. The decision taken by the arbitration panel has the char-
acter of a works agreement, which is an enforceable contract-like document.
As in the case of collective bargaining, establishment-level interest represen-
tation heavily emphasizes the collective over the individual level. The WCA
exercises strong regulatory powers over establishment-level labor relations
as well as conflict resolution. In the case of collective bargaining, the law
provides for a general framework based on which collective actors negoti-
ate; the effect of the WCA at the establishment level is much more
immediate.
Individual-Regulated Subsystem: Statutory Employment Rights
A third level through which workers’ grievances can be expressed is individ-
ual employment rights. Many aspects of the employment relationship are
regulated by collective bargaining or through works agreements at the
establishment level. German law provides for a variety of minimum stan-
dards in areas such as maximum length of the working day, minimum vaca-
tion days, safety and health standards, maternity leave, and—enacted in
2015—minimum wages. Statutory minimum standards are important
because, first, they provide for a minimum floor and, second, more than a
third of all German workplaces with more than five employees are not cov-
ered by either collective bargaining or works councils. Employees can liti-
gate their claims in a special labor court system, a branch of the public
court system that is fairly easy to access, with a local court available in many
localities that charges moderate fees (Weiss 2012). Thus, this subsystem cov-
ers all employees and is not confined to operating within the union-
represented sector.
Compared with the two other areas of dispute resolution (collective bar-
gaining and establishment-level worker representation through works coun-
cils), the litigation of workers’ claims is certainly the most individualized
area. As juridification of German labor relations suggests, all three areas are
regulated by statute or constitutional rights. The effect of regulation in col-
lective bargaining (‘‘framework regulation’’) is less immediate than the two
remaining areas. This is not to suggest, however, that the three areas of
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conflict resolution are independent of each other, an aspect that will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
Conflict, Complementarities, and Change in German Labor Relations
As we argued in the beginning of the article, complementarities first
include that both sets of institutions are not just the same. As the brief
description of Germany’s dual system of IR suggests, both elements of the
system are based on diverse general principles. First, the two arenas are
dominated by different actors: works councils and plant management at the
establishment level, and labor unions and employers’ association (in some
instances, individual employers) in the case of collective bargaining above
the establishment level. Also, different laws apply to regulate the two pillars:
the WCA in the case of the establishment level and the Collective
Bargaining Act and Section 9 of the German Constitution in the case of
labor relations above the establishment. As far as the key tasks to be pursued
by the actors at both levels are concerned, the dissimilarities are also quite
striking. The WCA prohibits works councils from negotiating collective
agreements, while Section 2 of the Collective Bargaining Act assigns the sole
responsibility for concluding agreements on wages, hours, and working con-
ditions to unions, employers, and employers’ associations.
As we have also argued, complementarities might come in different
forms, either as institutions supplementing each other (compensating for
each other’s shortcomings) or by providing for synergies (mutually reinfor-
cing effects). As the case of the dual system clearly shows, there is much
room for synergies. The de jure rigid separation of responsibilities has
important consequences for potential employment-related conflict. As
responsibility for matters such as wages, hours, and working condition is
mostly removed from the establishment level and assigned to collective bar-
gaining parties, conflict arising from ‘‘distributive bargaining,’’ to use the
term introduced in Walton and McKersie’s (1965) seminal work, has been
largely removed from the plant level.
Being, at least to some degree, relieved of the task of having to negotiate
wages, plant-level management and works councils are free to address other
issues and problems. Working together to solve problems—‘‘integrative bar-
gaining,’’ according to Walton and McKersie’s (1965) concept—strengthens
a collaborative ethos between plant-level management and works councils.
As a result of these synergies, conflict does not end but is just regulated or
‘‘bounded.’’ There is still plenty of space for diverging interests at the estab-
lishment level. To mention just one example: The length of the workweek
is regulated by collective bargaining, but the works council is responsible
for the distribution of these hours over the workweek, rules determining
the beginning and end of the work day, overtime work, working-time
accounts (whereby hours can be banked to take time off at a later point in
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time), as well as procedures for the measurement and documentation of
working time.
Complementarities are also affected by major developments within the
larger system of German labor relations institutions. First, coverage by both
works councils and multi-employer bargaining has been declining for more
than 20 years, as has union density (Keller and Kirsch 2016). The same is
true for employers’ associations, as their decreasing membership as well as
the introduction of a new bargaining-free membership status has contribu-
ted significantly to reduced collective bargaining (Behrens and Helfen
2018). This ongoing decline reduces the areas within the German political
economy for which complementary institutions are effective and, in turn,
increases the size of those unregulated areas, which are subject to voluntar-
ist and more individualized modes of dispute resolution. In addition, a
strong and enduring tendency toward the decentralization of collective bar-
gaining (mostly through opening clauses that empower firm-level actors to
deviate from standards agreed upon at the industry level) reduces the sys-
tem’s power to keep distributional bargaining (and the conflict that comes
along with it) away from the establishment level (Traxler 2003). By bringing
works councils back into collective bargaining, complementarities within
the wider system of regulating work-related conflict have been weakened.
United States
Workplace dispute resolution in the United States operates through three
distinct subsystems. First, union-represented workplaces feature elaborate
contractual grievance procedures that culminate in binding arbitration by
private neutral labor arbitrators. Second, statutory and common law
employment rights are enforced through a complex and highly conflictual
court litigation system. Third, non-union workplaces feature a range of pro-
cedures and systems for conflict management adopted and managed unilat-
erally by employers. These three distinct subsystems produce a fractured
landscape for workplace dispute resolution in the United States that is char-
acterized by its individualistic focus and privatized structure.
Collective-Voluntarist Subsystem: Unionized Workplace Conflict
and Grievance Procedures
Dispute resolution in unionized workplaces in the United States is shaped
by the distinctive American system of labor relations, which originated in
the Wagner Act model dating back to the 1930s. Historically, under this
model, there was a strong emphasis on the use of the strike weapon in sup-
port of bargaining demands, though in recent years strike rates have
declined dramatically (Katz et al. 2017). Governmental assistance in resol-
ving interest disputes in collective bargaining is provided by the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Services, which offers mediators to help the par-
ties reach negotiated settlements. For interest disputes over the terms of a
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new labor contract, the government has no provision for direct intervention
to resolve the conflict by imposing terms. These features reflect the strong
emphasis in the US system on encouraging the parties to resolve collective
labor–management disputes voluntarily.
At the same time they accepted the use of the strike weapon in contract
renewal disputes, US labor relations were concerned about the disruptive
effects of industrial conflict over workplace issues during the term of the
collective agreement. This led to the widespread adoption of grievance pro-
cedures culminating in binding arbitration to resolve workplace disputes
involving the application of a contract. The standard grievance-arbitration
procedure in a unionized workplace in the United States typically involves
three to five steps. A grievance filed by the union is discussed by successively
higher levels of union and management representatives and, if unresolved,
is submitted to arbitration. The final labor arbitration step, central to this
system of workplace dispute resolution, avoids the disruptive effects of
industrial action in the workplace and provides industrial justice.
The US labor arbitration system is a privatized system of workplace dis-
pute resolution established by the collective agreement negotiated by the
parties. The labor arbitrators are private, third-party neutrals, jointly
selected by the parties. This system has proved remarkably successful and
resilient. One indicator of this is that while many aspects of US labor rela-
tions have undergone major transformations in recent decades, grievance-
arbitration procedures remain nearly universal in unionized workplaces and
retain the same basic structure and function as they have since the 1950s.
As a result, the most salient change in regard to these procedures is their
declining reach: By 2017, the rate of union representation in the United
States had declined to only 11.9% of the workforce (BLS 2018).
Individual-Regulated Subsystem: Employment Rights Litigation
Employment law in the United States is based on the doctrine of employ-
ment-at-will, under which an employer is entitled to dismiss an employee
for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, with no need for notice,
severance payment, or any possibility of reinstatement. This rule gives
American employers free rein to manage their workplaces and makes the
United States a strongly employer-favorable system compared with other
countries. In recent decades, however, there has been an expansion of stat-
utory and common law protections for employees, including anti-
discrimination laws, wage and hour laws, and other exceptions to the
employment-at-will rule. These protections have led to a growth in the num-
ber and importance of individual employment rights conflicts (Colvin
2012). An important characteristic of how these disputes are resolved in the
United States is that they are mostly litigated by private parties in the gen-
eral courts, rather than through a specialized employment tribunal or gov-
ernment agencies. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity
12 ILR REVIEW
Commission brings less than 2% of the claims in court under the Civil
Rights Act, with the remainder being brought by private parties (Colvin
2016).
The American litigation system for resolving employment disputes is dis-
tinctive in the complexity of its procedures and the high-risk, high-reward
nature of outcomes. The average case takes approximately two years to
resolve through a trial (Colvin 2011), before which complex preliminary
procedures take place. But employees who can reach trial win many cases
and have the opportunity to collect sizable damages. The complexity of
defending employment law cases, as well as the uncertainty of outcomes
with the potential for large damage awards, provides a source of bargaining
leverage for US employees in individual employment rights cases (Colvin
2016). Most cases settle, with those that can survive summary judgment
motions receiving particularly large settlements. The impact of the threat of
employment litigation for US employers goes beyond the settlement of indi-
vidual cases. Many employers therefore take internal organizational mea-
sures to avoid litigation, including training and monitoring managers to
avoid discriminatory behaviors and establishing internal complaint proce-
dures to resolve problems before they result in litigation.
Individual-Voluntarist Subsystem: Dispute Resolution in Non-Union
Workplaces
The United States lacks any direct legal or policy requirements for organiza-
tions to have workplace dispute resolution procedures. In practice, however,
many US companies do have internal organizational dispute resolution pro-
cedures, some of which are elaborate and include due process protections.
What explains the adoption of these procedures? One major category of
explanations is institutional pressure on organizations to avoid the threats
of union organizing and litigation (Colvin 2003). Given the all-or-nothing
structure of union representation under the exclusive representation sys-
tem, US employers have a strong incentive to adopt measures that reduce
the likelihood of successful union-organizing campaigns. Non-union dispute
resolution procedures are a commonly used union substitution practice that
many employers adopt to at least partially replicate the benefits of union-
ized workplace grievance procedures. US employers also have strong incen-
tives to adopt practices that reduce the threat of employment litigation.
Non-union dispute resolution procedures can help accomplish this by resol-
ving workplace conflicts before they develop into employment law disputes
involving lawyers and lawsuits. These procedures may also help reduce the
threat of litigation by allowing employers to more readily identify and
address problematic behavior by managers that may lead to future work-
place conflicts. Another category of explanations for the adoption of non-
union dispute resolution procedures by US employers involves efforts to
enhance workplace conflict management as part of human resource
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strategies, particularly those focused on high-commitment and high-
involvement practices (Colvin 2003).
The lack of specific legal mandates and diverse motivations for adoption
has led to a wide range of experimentation in forms and structures for non-
union dispute resolution procedures in the United States. One area of
experimentation is who decides the outcome of complaints under the
procedure. Whereas most companies have procedures for management
decision-makers, some have adopted a peer review system in which lower-
level employees who are peers of the complainant sit on a panel that
reviews and decides the outcome of the dispute (Colvin 2003). The process
of dispute resolution varies, with some procedures including arbitration-like
hearings and others incorporating steps that involve some form of media-
tion to attempt to achieve a negotiated resolution of the dispute. Some com-
panies have set up organizational ombudsman offices that use a range of
consensual methods to attempt to resolve workplace conflicts. In addition,
whereas some organizations have simple stand-alone procedures, others
have adopted more elaborate conflict management systems with multiple
elements and methods of resolving a range of workplace conflicts (Lipsky,
Seeber, and Fincher 2003). Meanwhile, in contrast to these various organi-
zational experiments in conflict resolution, many US non-union workplaces
continue to have no dispute resolution procedures in place, forcing workers
to rely on the goodwill of management for fair treatment in the workplace.
Interactions between the Subsystems in the United States
Each of the three dispute resolution subsystems in the United States has its
own distinct domain and mode of operation. In some respects, they can be
distinguished by the contrasting realms within which each operates. The
hard distinction between union and non-union workplaces deriving from
the exclusive representation system produces a corresponding strong dis-
tinction between workplace dispute resolution systems in union and non-
union workplaces. The employment litigation system is built around the res-
olution of legal claims through the public courts, whereas non-union work-
place dispute resolution systems have arisen in the absence of legal
mandates and are private procedures, internal to the organization.
Despite these distinct realms, important interactions also occur among
the three subsystems. As described, institutional threats from both the
unionized workplace and the employment litigation systems are key factors
leading to the development of procedures in the non-union workplace dis-
pute resolution system. Although not directly linked by public policy, these
interactions form a type of indirect synergistic relationship that has
strengthened non-union dispute resolution procedures.
Recent years have seen intensified interactions among the subsystems.
Most notably, since the 1990s many non-union employers have adopted
arbitration procedures to resolve employment law disputes with employees.
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Under these procedures, known as mandatory arbitration, employees are
required to enter into an agreement as a condition of employment. This
agreement states that they will resolve any legal complaints against the com-
pany through binding arbitration, without the option of going to court or
appealing the arbitrator’s decision. These mandatory arbitration procedures
have become very controversial in the United States, as research indicates
that arbitrators are less likely to rule in favor of employees and are more
likely to award much lower damages than the courts award, and may evi-
dence a repeat player bias to the advantage of employers (Colvin 2011). In
contrast to the synergistic complementarities involved in encouraging the
adoption of non-union workplace dispute resolution procedures, this is an
instance of a negative complementarity. The expansion of mandatory arbi-
tration has undermined the effectiveness of the employment litigation sys-
tem for resolving workplace disputes. This development represents a major
change in workplace conflict resolution in the United States, as indicated by
a 2017 survey showing that 56% of private-sector non-union employees are
now subject to mandatory arbitration procedures (Colvin 2018).
Another synergistic complementarity that has recently emerged is the use
of collective labor law rights, originally focused on unions, in relation to
employment law and non-union workplace conflicts. Under Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, all employees have the right to engage in con-
certed action for mutual aid and protection. Although this right was tradi-
tionally applied to protect union activity in the workplace, it broadly
encompasses any form of concerted action, whether union related or not
and regardless of the union status of employees. In recent years, Section 7
rights have been applied more broadly to deal with conflicts such as the dis-
ciplining and dismissal of employees for discussing workplace problems on
Facebook.
Another emerging area of positive complementarity involves the role of
unions in employment law conflicts. Unions have historically enhanced the
effectiveness of enforcement of employment law rights, such as health and
safety standards and wage and hour rules, in the workplace. Unions have
shown little or no interest, however, in representing non-union workers,
apart from the context of union organizing campaigns where they sought to
obtain representation status for the whole workforce under the exclusive
representation system. In the past few years, some unions have begun focus-
ing their efforts on using employment law reforms to obtain benefits for all
employees, not just those in union-represented workplaces. The most prom-
inent and significant example is the effort to substantially increase the mini-
mum wage in the ‘‘Fight for $15’’ campaign, which achieved its signature
breakthrough success in Seattle in 2013 under the leadership of S.E.I.U.
Local 775.
Despite these recent developments, the overall structure of workplace dis-
pute resolution in the United States remains characterized by fragmenta-
tion, decentralization, privatization, and individualization. The lack of
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strong collective structures is exacerbated by the low—and declining—level
of union representation. The system of employment litigation that has
expanded in its wake is characterized predominantly by individual claims by
workers. Similarly, non-union workplace dispute resolution procedures are
structures designed to resolve individual worker complaints and disputes
and, in many cases, established with the primary goal of avoiding collective
representation of workers. Workplace dispute resolution in the United
States is also characterized by voluntary and privatized structures and sys-
tems. Unionized workplace grievance and arbitration procedures are estab-
lished by contract and operated by unions and management with private
neutral arbitrators. Although employment litigation occurs through the
public courts, the vast majority of cases are brought by individual employees
represented by private plaintiff attorneys. Non-union workplace dispute res-
olution systems are private organizational procedures. The rise of manda-
tory arbitration further intensifies this individualized, private structure of
workplace dispute resolution in the United States as even public employ-
ment law claims are shifted to a privately designed and administered dispute
resolution system.
Italy
The Italian system of conflict resolution is based on two subsystems: collec-
tive bargaining and employment rights litigation. Within the framework
adopted in this article, the first is voluntarist and collective in nature,
whereas the second is mostly individual and regulated.
Collective-Voluntarist Subsystem: Collective Bargaining
A high level of voluntarism and a minimal degree of legal intervention char-
acterizes the Italian collective bargaining system (Regalia and Regini 1998).
According to Treu,
the major feature in the Italian bargaining system is its lack of any specific legal
provisions for the bargaining procedure, scope and content of the agreements
and, in general, for the conduct of the parties to the negotiation and application
of collective agreements, with the exception of provisions of civil law concerning
contracts in general. (2007: 183)
In Italy, collective agreements are acts by private actors and therefore
apply to the members of signatory employers’ associations and trade unions.
A significant exception is related to minimum wage levels set by collective
agreements, which have been considered by the jurisprudence as references
for the principle of ‘‘fair pay’’ as foreseen by Art. 36 of the Italian
Constitution. Still, even if highly voluntary, Italian sectoral collective agree-
ments are widely applied by Italian companies. Indeed, collective bargain-
ing coverage is estimated at 80% by international sources (Visser 2016) and
99% by national sources (Istat-CNEL 2016).
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The articulation of the collective bargaining system is also based on the
agreement between the parties. Historically, the sectoral and enterprise lev-
els have often vied for primacy, depending on shifting power relations
among the actors (Regalia and Regini 1998). Generally, however, the sec-
toral level set minimum standards that could be improved at enterprise
level (Baccaro and Pulignano 2016). This bipolar structure was formalized
by a framework agreement negotiated by the social partners and the gov-
ernment in 1993: The national sectoral level should set minimum homoge-
neous standards for the industry and keep up with inflation, while the
company level should improve conditions in the workplace and distribute
productivity. In more recent years, pressures for reform produced divisions
among the parties, particularly concerning the possibility for lower-level
agreements (company or territorial) to derogate in pejus sectoral agree-
ments. In 2009, a framework agreement introducing opening clauses was
signed by the employers’ association Confindustria and by two of the three
confederal unions, CISL and UIL; CGIL was strongly opposed. This frame-
work agreement was substituted in subsequent years with unitary agreements
foreseeing more moderate derogatory possibilities. Still, an unprecedented
intervention by the government in 2011 enabled company-level bargaining
to derogate sectoral agreements and even certain aspects of statute law
(Colombo and Regalia 2016).
Procedures for resolving interest disputes or for defining the negotiating
procedure are not part of the formal structure of the system, even if histori-
cally the Ministry of Labor (in its central and peripheral articulation) has
frequently played a mediating role in case the parties were unable to arrive
at an agreement (Treu 2007). The sole exception are contractual clauses
that stipulate a peace obligation during the initial phase of negotiations
(three months before and one month after the expiration of a collective
agreement). Italian collective agreements do not include any other peace
clauses, though discussion about such provisions has re-emerged in recent
years and the inclusion of stricter peace obligations into sectoral collective
agreements was agreed upon by the social partners in a 2014 interconfed-
eral agreement (Baccaro and Pulignano 2016).
Conciliation procedures for dealing with the respect of standards set in
the collective agreements are included in almost all collective agreements,
but they are voluntary procedures. Still, the enforcement of agreements is
secured in the first place by the parties themselves through a process of con-
tinuous bargaining and, ultimately, strikes (Treu 2007). Being strongly
dependent on the presence of employee representatives in the workplace,
this mechanism of dispute resolution is available only to a minority of
Italian employees in the private sector. Only 20.7% of private-sector work-
places have employee representatives (Istat-CNEL 2016). Yet the number of
workers covered is surely significantly higher, since they are more likely to
be found in bigger companies.
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The absence of clear and mutually accepted procedures for dealing with
both interests and rights disputes within the collective bargaining system
has encouraged recourse to conflict as a way to test and demonstrate power
relationships (Regalia and Regini 1998). The right to strike is set in the
Italian Constitution, and the (comparatively few) rules regulating it were set
not by law but by ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court. Moreover,
since the right to strike is considered an individual right, collective agree-
ments refrained from regulating it, and the (albeit very limited) peace obli-
gations they set only bind signing organizations and not individual workers.
Even if formally almost unrestricted and still quite high in comparative
perspective, strike activity declined significantly over the past four decades.
Working days lost per 1,000 employees were on average more than 1,000
per year from 1970 to 1979 (Bordogna and Cella 2002) and around 40
between 2005 and 2009 (Vandaele 2016: 282).
Individual-Regulated Subsystem: Employment Rights Litigation
The second component of the Italian conflict resolution system is the litiga-
tion system. This highly regulated subsystem deals with both individual and
collective rights. Labor courts have a strong role and the use of alternative
instruments, such as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or arbitra-
tion, is limited. In Italy, no specialized labor courts exist, but specialized
chambers within the civil court system provide a functional equivalent to
specialization. Employment claims follow a special procedure, different
from ordinary civil practice, in order to speed up the adjudication process,
which is quite long in Italy—536 days for a case being adjudicated in first
instance (Comande´ 2014: 121).
The number of cases dealt with in this subsystem has been decreasing for
the past two decades. In 1995, the number of new labor cases brought in
front of the courts was 195,649, while in 2014 there were 120,720 new cases
(Istat datawarehouse 2018). Still, in recent years, reducing the number of
claims and their length has been a significant issue in the political discus-
sion. This goal has been pursued in multiple ways. First, there have been
attempts to subtract areas of the employment relationship from the scrutiny
of the judge, as in the case of the new discipline of unfair dismissals intro-
duced in 2015 (Colombo and Regalia 2016). Second, the labor trial itself
was reformed, with the introduction of fees and shorter deadlines for acces-
sing justice that made it more difficult for workers. Last, attempts to pro-
mote alternative dispute resolution mechanisms were envisaged, but, as we
will see below, with scarce effects (Comande´ 2014).
Extra-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms are not widespread in Italy.
Apart from the period between 1998 and 2010 in which a preventive
attempt of conciliation was mandatory before litigation, workers are free to
lodge claims in front of a court, with the sole exception since 2012 of cases
concerning individual dismissals for economic reasons. Two types of
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voluntary forms of conciliation exist: administrative conciliation, which is
carried out by a special board at the Provincial Labour Directorate (the ter-
ritorial office of the Labour Ministry), and the trade union conciliation (con-
ciliazione sindacale). Administrative conciliation is carried out by a tripartite
conciliation committee and, if successful, produces a legally enforceable
agreement. Trade union conciliation takes place before a trade union offi-
cial and is regulated by collective agreements. If successful, the report
entailing the terms of the agreement must be deposited at the Provincial
Labour Directorate. In 2017, only 7,407 disputes were settled through
administrative conciliation (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali
2018). Although no systematic data are available, trade union conciliation
seems to be more widespread. A relatively high trade union density rate
(34.4% in 2016 according to OECD data) ensures that the resolution of
individual employment disputes outside the judicial realm—which, in the
United States assumes a highly individual and anti-labor character—
maintains a close link to collective actors and has a lower risk of negative
outcomes for workers.
Arbitration is even rarer in Italy. Two forms are used: ritual and irritual
arbitration. The main distinction between the two rests in the nature of the
award. In the case of ritual arbitration, the award itself is a legally enforce-
able decision, whereas in the case of irritual arbitration, the award has the
force of an agreement; noncompliance requires the aggrieved party to file a
claim to obtain enforcement. Ritual arbitration can take place only in very
limited instances: It must be provided for by law or by collective agreement,
both parties need to agree to arbitration, and not all statutory rights can be
dealt with through this method. Attempts to promote irritual arbitration
were enhanced in recent legislation and, in particular, by Law 183/2010,
which allowed clauses deferring future disputes to arbitration into the indi-
vidual employment contract (Comande´ 2014: 126). Because of strong pres-
sure from trade unions, however, this possibility was extremely limited. It is
permissible only if it is foreseen by a collective agreement, is certified by a
specific commission, is not signed within the first 30 days of the validity of
the employment contract (i.e., it cannot be signed at the moment of hir-
ing), and does not refer to dismissals. Hence, the efforts made to boost the
use of arbitration for employment disputes did not bring many results and
the use of arbitration remains very limited.
Interactions between the Subsystems in Italy
The two subsystems that characterize the Italian conflict resolution system
are autonomous but closely interact in a supplementary way. The wide cov-
erage of collective agreements, stipulated within the highly voluntarist and
collective system of collective bargaining, continues to make them a very
important source of regulation of employment relations. Even if statutory
employment rights constitute a minimum floor in the absence of collective
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regulation, uncovered areas are much less widespread in Italy than in other
countries, at least for what concerns dependent employees. Hence, employ-
ment rights are not only individual, but still largely collective in nature.
Moreover, collective actors play a crucial role in the expression of individual
grievances, since individual workers are often assisted by trade unions in
dealing with them (Treu 2007: 198). In addition, unions play a significant
role in making workers aware of their rights. This means that the distinction
between union and non-union workplaces that is important in other coun-
tries is not as significant in the Italian system. At the same time, the public
system of labor courts supports the functioning of the collective bargaining
system by ensuring compliance with the rights it sets and by sanctioning
anti-union behavior.
The supplementary role of the employment rights litigation subsystem
has acquired growing importance in recent years, which is attributable to
the developments taking place within the collective voluntarist bargaining
system. First, the declining presence of trade unions at the workplace level
reduces their capacity to autonomously deal with compliance issues by the
traditional instruments of continuous bargaining and strikes, and it makes
litigation increasingly important, even if not necessarily in quantitative
terms. Second, growing inter-union conflict, the spread of so-called separate
agreements, and the disruptive autonomous action of individual agents
(such as Fiat’s exit from the employer association Confindustria in order to
avoid the application of the sectoral collective agreement) have pointed to
the limits of voluntarism in dealing with disputes emerging within the col-
lective bargaining system. Since 2009, labor courts have found themselves
called to solve, with the scarce instruments provided by a highly unregu-
lated system, numerous judicial disputes on key functioning principles of
the system, such as the titularity of the right to bargain collectively and to
set representation bodies at the plant level. Still, the (often undesired) role
played by judges could only provide a provisional remedy to the problems
derived by growing inter-party disagreements in a voluntarist system, urging
several commentators to ask for statutory regulation of IR (Colombo and
Regalia 2016). However, the movement of the traditional collective-
voluntary system in a direction toward stronger regulation has still not taken
place.
Australia
Workplace dispute resolution in Australia is highly regulated and has both
individual and collective elements. From a VoC perspective, Australia is
often classified as a liberal market economy (LME) and, like the United
States, is a common law country; however, historically its distinctive award
system of IR has meant that it has diverged dramatically from practices in
the archetypal LME case of the United States.
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Collective-Regulated Subsystem: The Traditional Award System
For much of the 20th century, the defining feature of Australian IR was its
system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration (C&A). Industrial tribu-
nals at the state and federal level were charged with resolving disputes
between unions and employers through conciliation and, where necessary,
arbitration. Settlements were contained in enforceable ‘‘awards’’—regula-
tory instruments that established the terms and conditions of employment
for the majority of employees and that were effectively ‘‘policed’’ by unions
using both formal and, more commonly, informal means. Collective bar-
gaining played a secondary role and individuals enjoyed very few statutory
employment rights. In short, the system was collective and regulated.
Today, the state remains closely involved in IR; extensive and transforma-
tive legislative changes since the late 1980s, however, have significantly
altered the role of tribunals and awards (see Van Gramberg, Bamber,
Teicher, and Cooper 2014). Workers enjoy a range of statutory employment
rights, as well as the minimum conditions set out in revamped ‘‘modern
awards’’—now made and varied through an administrative process rather
than to settle industrial disputes. The system retains a collective element by
providing scope for union involvement in collective bargaining and the
enforcement of individual workers’ rights. However, in Australia, the distinc-
tion between union and non-union workplaces is blurred because collective
agreements can be made with or without unions. Moreover, unions have
suffered an ongoing membership decline and collective bargaining cover-
age has fallen markedly (Gahan, Pekarek, and Nicholson 2018), suggesting
that the balance will continue to shift from collectivism toward greater
individualism.
The principal statute governing IR in Australia is the Fair Work Act
(2009; FWA). The FWA establishes a comprehensive regulatory framework
for IR covering most Australian workplaces, with key features including a
range of minimum employment standards contained in both legislation and
‘‘modern awards,’’ detailed rules for collective bargaining, and dedicated
public agencies tasked with administering the system. Conflict resolution
under the FWA encompasses both rights disputes over the interpretation
and application of existing entitlements and interest disputes over the cre-
ation of new rights through collective bargaining. In seeking to resolve rights
disputes, individual employees can generally bring complaints against
employers directly, or they can seek the support of a union. Although inter-
est disputes are (still) predominantly the domain of unions, the FWA systems
afford them few exclusive responsibilities in the management of workplace
conflict. Further, in both these spheres of conflict, the FWA either requires
or enables the involvement of public agencies. Specifically, an industrial tri-
bunal called the Fair Work Commission (FWC) is central to the operation of
the FWA system. It performs a range of functions such as setting minimum
wages, making and changing modern awards, overseeing collective bargain-
ing, and resolving disputes. A separate agency, the Fair Work Ombudsman
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(FWO), is tasked with promoting and ensuring compliance with workplace
legislation. The FWO’s ‘‘strategic enforcement’’ model emphasizes voluntary
dispute resolution, with more coercive sanctions and litigation reserved for
more serious noncompliance (Hardy 2014).
Collective-Voluntarist Subsystem: Collective Bargaining
For much of the 20th century, collective bargaining played a secondary role
in Australia’s system of conciliation and arbitration. Beginning in the mid-
1980s, however, new wage-fixing principles and legislative changes saw
enterprise-level collective bargaining emerge as an important mechanism
for setting wages and conditions of employment (Gahan and Pekarek
2012). As of June 2016, an estimated 21.0% of employees were covered by
current (federal) collective agreements, down from a peak of 28.8% in June
2011 (Peetz and Yu 2017).1 This downward trend is expected to continue
in line with an ongoing decline in the number of agreements made (Gahan
et al. 2018).
As federal governments have pursued their IR agendas, the rules for
enterprise bargaining have become increasingly complex.
As noted, pertinent legislation emphasizes collective bargaining at the
enterprise level. Although there are limited provisions for multi-employer
bargaining, employees are not permitted to take industrial action in pursuit
of multi-employer agreements. The majority of enterprise agreements apply
only to a single employer and some or all of their employees. Industrial
action can only be taken during bargaining and is subject to detailed proce-
dural requirements (e.g., secret ballot). The level of industrial disputation
has declined significantly in recent decades and is at a historical low.
Unions lack exclusive representation rights in bargaining, with employees
able to appoint a person of their choice (including themselves) as bargain-
ing representative. In practice, most enterprise agreements are union agree-
ments, and these provide a wage premium over non-union agreements.
However, even when unions are involved in negotiations, an employer can
put agreement offers directly to an employee vote, against union recom-
mendations. Unions have suffered a long-term decline in membership, with
density decreasing from around 40% in 1990 to the current 13.2%. This
trend, along with a recent decline in the level of agreement-making and
coverage, and several years of wage stagnation, raises questions about the
future of collective bargaining as a pillar of IR regulation in Australia.
Whatever its consequences, the FWA does not appear to provide unions
with the support necessary to organize or bargain effectively. Indeed,
Australian unions have declared the enterprise bargaining system ‘‘broken’’
1The figure is higher when using a different estimate that includes agreements made under residual
state-level IR jurisdictions and those agreements that have nominally expired but continue to apply. On
this basis, an estimated 36.4% of employees were covered by collective agreements as of May 2016, down
from a peak of 43.3% in 2010 (Peetz and Yu 2017).
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and are calling for broader reforms to the industrial framework (Gahan
et al. 2018).
The legislation regulates both the procedural and substantive content of
enterprise agreements. Some provisions are mandatory for all agreements
(e.g., dispute resolution, change consultation) while certain claims are
unlawful (e.g., bargaining services fees). Dispute resolution clauses in enter-
prise agreements can specify either the FWC or an alternative dispute reso-
lution (ADR) provider to assist the parties with settling disputes. However,
with the FWC providing free and independent assistance, uptake of ADR
has been very limited (Forsyth 2012). The content of agreements is vetted
by the tribunal, with approval subject to an agreement leaving employees
‘‘better off overall’’ than the relevant modern award. Agreements can have
a maximum nominal term of four years; however, formally expired agree-
ments continue to operate unless terminated or replaced by a new agree-
ment. Where the FWC grants an application to terminate an expired
agreement, employees revert back to the minimum conditions set out in
modern awards. Although there are restrictions on the unilateral termina-
tion of agreements, there are now numerous prominent examples of
employers succeeding in their termination bids in the context of bargaining
disputes, and the propensity of employers to invoke this tactic appears to be
growing (Gahan et al. 2018).
As this suggests, the legislation provides a significant role for the FWC to
facilitate bargaining and resolve disputes (Pekarek et al. 2017). The tribunal
can compel reluctant employers to bargain in cases for which the majority
of employees wish to negotiate an enterprise agreement and can resolve dis-
putes between parties over the appropriate coverage of a proposed enter-
prise agreement. Moreover, the legislation requires bargaining in good
faith and enables the tribunal to redress tactics that breach good-faith bar-
gaining obligations. Note that the tribunal can assist the parties with resol-
ving bargaining disputes if so requested. However, there is only very limited
scope for the FWC to arbitrate, in contrast to earlier periods in Australian
IR. In this respect, the shift from the traditional award model to a greater
emphasis on enterprise-level bargaining represents a move in the Australian
system from a collective-regulated subsystem toward a more collective-
voluntarist subsystem, albeit within a highly prescriptive legal framework.
Individual-Regulated Subsystem: Individual Employment Rights
The FWA provides employees with a range of protections and entitlements
that might be the subject of rights disputes. At the heart of these provisions
is a ‘‘safety net’’ of minimum terms and conditions comprising 10 National
Employment Standards (NES; e.g., maximum weekly working hours, guar-
anteed leave entitlements), a national minimum wage, as well as 122 ‘‘mod-
ern awards.’’ These modern awards set out the minimum terms and
conditions (e.g., minimum pay) applicable to different industries (e.g.,
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retail, banking) or occupations (e.g., aircraft cabin crew, nurses), and cover
most employees. While the NES are contained in legislation, the national
minimum wage and modern awards are made by the FWC. The tribunal
reviews the minimum wage rates set by modern awards annually and reviews
all modern awards every four years.
All modern awards include a dispute resolution clause regarding matters
arising under the NES and the modern award. This clause sets out a proce-
dure requiring that the parties first attempt to resolve the dispute through
discussions at the workplace before they may refer it to the FWC for resolu-
tion through mediation, conciliation or, where agreed to by the parties,
arbitration. Generally, to bring a dispute or make a claim under an applica-
ble instrument, such as a modern award, the applicant must still be in
employment with the employer concerned.
Further, the FWA provides the parties with general protections from vari-
ous forms of unfair treatment, discrimination, and victimization in the work-
place and also contains anti-bullying provisions.
Finally, the FWA offers employees protection from unfair dismissal sub-
ject to certain eligibility requirements (e.g., minimum qualifying periods).
Unfair dismissal cases are decided by the FWC. In 2016–2017, there were
14,135 unfair dismissal applications, making it the most common type of
application and accounting for 43% of the FWC’s caseload (FWC 2017).
Over time, the tribunal has seen a significant shift in its work from collective
disputes to more individual rights-based disputes.
Complementarities, Variety, and Change in Workplace Dispute Resolution
In Australia, some interaction occurs between the systems of individual
employment rights and collective bargaining in the management of work-
place conflict. In particular, modern awards create a floor for enterprise
bargaining, as the FWC is tasked with ensuring that enterprise agreements
submitted for approval pass the ‘‘better off overall test’’ (BOOT). This pro-
vision seeks to prevent employers from undercutting minimum employment
standards through collective bargaining. The interaction of these systemic
features constitutes a synergistic complementarity.
Further, the parties can seek intervention by the FWC to help ensure bar-
gaining proceeds in good faith. Although the parties use these provisions
strategically, their existence has also had a strong shadow effect in promot-
ing more orderly bargaining behavior (Pekarek et al. 2017). In other words,
the FWC plays an important role in facilitating bargaining and in resolving
protracted and intractable disputes. Thus, a synergistic complementarity is
in place across the regulatory/voluntarist divide in that the legislative provi-
sions for the involvement of a public third party can help address conflict
between the private parties in bargaining. Restrictions on the tribunal’s
capacity to arbitrate disputes, however, arguably limit the more complete
realization of this complementarity.
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Because most Australian employees are covered by modern awards or
enterprise agreements, and these instruments must include dispute resolu-
tion clauses, it might appear that individual employees can readily seek
redress should disputes arise. However, there is a difference between the
availability of legal provisions and their use in practice. In recent years, there
have been a number of high-profile, egregious examples of ‘‘wage theft’’
and other breaches of workplace laws by employers (Healy 2016). Similarly,
audits and investigations by the FWO have highlighted significant levels of
noncompliance with workplace laws by employers in industries such as hospi-
tality, fast food, and retail. The considerable extent of noncompliance stands
in contrast to the relatively small number of disputes lodged with the FWC
under dispute resolution clauses in awards and enterprise agreements.
Although many disputes may be resolved within workplaces before they
reach the FWC, and employers may adopt additional internal grievance proce-
dures to discourage the use of formal provisions, the extent of illegal work
practices uncovered in some sectors suggests that potential employee grie-
vances are either not aired or not addressed. In short, dispute resolution
clauses in regulatory instruments may not be a sufficient deterrent to employ-
ers adopting illegal work practices. It may be that workers are not aware of
their legal entitlements and avenues for redress when employers fail to follow
the law, or that employees—particularly those in non-union workplaces, small
firms, or migrant workers—might be reluctant to invoke formal procedures
against their employer for fear of reprisal (Hardy 2014). This concern raises
questions about the enforcement of statutory employment standards and the
capacity of individual employees to avail themselves of their legal rights.
In the evolution of the Australia system of IR and conflict resolution, a
critical question thus arises over the issue of enforcement. Union density
continues its longer-term decline, and this has reduced the capacity of
unions to resolve disputes and enforce labor standards as part of their tradi-
tional functions. As Hardy (2014) observed, grievances by former employees
account for the bulk of complaints to the FWO, which in part reflects a lack
of effective voice mechanisms, such as unions, to help resolve disputes while
still employed. Although the FWO plays a proactive role in monitoring and
enforcing compliance with workplace law, limited resources mean interven-
tion is selective. In the absence of a massive increase in public funding or a
reversal of union decline, it remains to be seen whether an enforcement
gap will grow between institutional design and functioning in practice, leav-
ing potential complementarities unrealized.
Discussion
In the beginning of this article, we predicted that the dispute resolution
practices and institutions of four selected countries could be classified along
two major dimensions: regulated-voluntarist and individual-collective. We
also suggested that within each of these countries, practices and institutions
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would be closely linked to each other, potentially leading to institutional
complementarities between the set of subsystems composing a national sys-
tem of dispute resolution.
As our analysis of the German, US, Italian, and Australian cases reveals,
dispute resolution practices and institutions varied not only among coun-
tries but also within them. While our two dimensions turned out to be a
fruitful heuristic with which to classify different dispute resolution practices
and institutions, we also found evidence that in many cases elements or sub-
systems within a given country provide for substantial variation in terms of
the regulated-voluntarist and individual-collective dimension. Unlike what
the standard literature on comparative labor relations leads us to expect
(see Figure 1), we found different subsystems follow different key principles.
As shown in Figure 2, the German dispute resolution system, which was ini-
tially classified as highly collective and regulated, combined diverse logics.
While the dual system of multi-employer collective bargaining and
establishment-level interest representation through works councils fits our
initial assumption by combining a strong influence of collective actors with
a high level of regulation (albeit state regulation being more important in
the case of works councils than in collective bargaining), we also found a
highly regulated but individualized subsystem as well. The enforcement of
Figure 2. Bounded within-Country Variation by Subsystem (Empirical Findings)
Collective Individual
Regulated
Germany (works 
councils and collective
bargaining dual 
representation)
Australia (Traditional 
Award System)
Australia (NES and
modern awards)
Italy (individual dispute 
resolution)
US (individual 
employment rights 
litigation)
Germany (statutory 
employment rights)
Voluntarist
Italy (collective 
bargaining)
US (unionized sector)
Australia (collective 
bargaining)
US (non-union dispute 
resolution)
26 ILR REVIEW
individual statutory employment rights gained importance as collective bar-
gaining and works council coverage are on the decline.
Diverse subsystems were also found in our Italian case. The collective and
voluntarist subsystem of collective bargaining fits our original perception of
the Italian dispute resolution system. We also found a subsystem in the area
of individual dispute resolution that is highly regulated and individual, a
classification that also applies for the Australian ‘‘modern award’’ and
National Employment Standards system, a highly regulated system adminis-
tered by the industrial tribunal. For Australia, however, we also uncovered a
collective bargaining system with the so-called BOOT resolving disagree-
ment between state regulation (modern award) and collectively agreed stan-
dards. Finally, three different sub-patterns emerged for the case of the
United States. While the system of grievance-arbitration (collective and
voluntarist) was found to be declining along with collective bargaining cov-
erage (as well as union density), we observed a growing pattern of non-
union dispute resolution that is highly voluntarist and individual. Finally, we
also found a highly regulated and individualized system based on the litiga-
tion of individual employment rights.
We began with national-level systems as the unit of analysis for our cases.
With the identification of variation in subsystems within national systems,
however, an important question is to what degree these subsystems repre-
sent regional variations in conflict resolution. Subnational regional variation
was more pronounced in some of our cases than in others. In the United
States, substantial variation emerged in patterns across states. The size and
importance of the unionized sector varied widely, from a high in union rep-
resentation of 25.3% of the workforce in New York State to as low as 3.9%
in South Carolina, one of the many right-to-work states exhibiting greater
institutional, social, and political hostility toward organized labor (BLS
2018). In the individual litigation subsystem, there was also substantial
regional variation in the United States, where, despite the existence of fed-
eral laws prohibiting workplace discrimination, state laws regulate many
aspects of employment relations and state courts are a major site of litiga-
tion (Colvin 2012). Historically, Australia has also had regional variation in
the regulation of employment relations and conflict resolution due to the
jurisdictional division between federal and state parliaments in IR. A major
part of the changes in the Australian IR system in recent years, however,
was a shift to the national level of regulation based on a new use of the con-
stitutional corporations’ power by federal governments (Wright and
Lansbury 2016). By contrast, Germany and Italy featured less variation in
their systems at the regional level, despite Germany also having a federal sys-
tem of government and negotiation of agreements at the state level.
Although regional variation is of interest, it is not the central organizing
structure behind the subsystems we have identified. Rather we found the
different conflict resolution subsystems to be operating at the same time as
other subsystems in the same space within national systems. This co-location
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of subsystems with different focuses and different functions was one of the
findings of our study.
So far, practices and institutions of national dispute resolution systems
might appear to be diverse, if not chaotic. Yet, this empirical analysis
revealed important ties between them. Some of those ties might provide for
institutional complementarities.
At a basic level, we found regulated and individual systems of dispute
resolutions to serve as subsystems of final resort. With union density, collec-
tive bargaining, and works council coverage declining in all of the countries
under observation, employment rights guaranteed by law provided for a
minimum floor available to those workers who did not benefit from collec-
tive regulation of labor relations. Working-time laws or statutory minimum
wages applied even to those workers who were not covered by a collective
agreement. Beyond this function of ‘‘supplementarity,’’ where one institu-
tion makes up for the deficiencies of the other (Crouch 2005), we also
observed examples of ‘‘synergies’’ whereby the effects of different subsys-
tems mutually enforced each other (Deeg 2005: 3). The classic example in
Germany was the way in which resolving distributive issues of wages through
the collective bargaining system facilitated the focus of establishment-level
works councils on integrative negotiation issues, with the potential for joint
problem solving. In the United States also, however, we found that the indi-
vidual employment rights litigation system provided a source of employee
power that encouraged the growth of non-union dispute resolution systems
incorporating some elements of fairness protections.
We also observed that as systems have changed over time, an element of
institutional lock-in appeared to influence or constrain the subsystems that
emerged and the pathways of change. In Germany, the declining coverage
of the dual system of collective representation occurred in conjunction with
an expanding system of statutory employment rights, but both reflected the
juridification of Germany’s more regulated system of conflict resolution.
Similarly, in Australia, modern awards made by tribunals continued to set
industry-specific minimums, but there was also an expansion in statutory
individual employment rights. Unions remained central to collective bar-
gaining, but the system also provided for non-union agreement-making.
Both Italy and the United States presented some additional complexity to
this picture. They exhibited the growing importance of subsystems that
involve regulated, individualized resolution of rights-based conflicts, despite
the voluntarist nature of other subsystems in those countries. In both cases,
this was connected to the fact that the reach of the more voluntarist collec-
tive bargaining subsystem has decreased. In the United States there was an
expansion of a similarly voluntarist system of individualized non-union dis-
pute resolution. This was not the case in Italy though, where the voluntary
resolution of individual disputes maintained a close connection to the col-
lective dimension through the importance of trade unions in assisting
workers.
28 ILR REVIEW
Nevertheless, a striking finding across all four of our national systems was
the decline in collective conflict resolution subsystems and the growing
importance (albeit not always reflected in a quantitative growth) of individ-
ualized, regulated conflict resolution subsystems. This finding supported
arguments that individual employment rights are becoming a more central
component of IR systems, and bolstered suggestions that these subsystems
need to become a more prominent focus of IR research and policy develop-
ment (Piore and Safford 2006; Colvin 2012).
Figure 3 shows the direction of change between subsystems across each of
our four national cases. There were some similarities across the cases. In all
four, there has been a move toward individual-regulated subsystems. In the
two countries with collective-regulated subsystems, Germany and Australia,
these have been in decline. In the three countries with collective-voluntarist
subsystems—Australia, Italy, and the United States—there was a shift from
these toward individual-regulated subsystems. But an individual-voluntarist
subsystem has become a substantial new component only in the United States.
In this respect, we continue to see an aspect of American exceptionalism.
Conclusion
This analysis provides a more complicated picture than those of the coher-
ent national systems that have come out of some comparative research, such
Figure 3. Directions of Change within Country Subsystems
Notes: Arrows in boldface indicate greater extent of change in the indicated directions.
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as the positive complementarities-based systems seen in the VoC literature
(Hall and Soskice 2001). By contrast, analyzing workplace conflict and its
resolution comparatively leads us to an understanding of national systems as
involving complex interactions among subsystems that have their own insti-
tutional logics, as well as important synergies, supplementarities, and even
in some instances negative complementarities. These subsystems do not fall
into a neat dichotomy of CME and LME models posited by the VoC per-
spective. All too often we find individual and collective, as well as regulated
and voluntarist, institutions for dispute resolution side by side within a sin-
gle country. Even more important, we find multiple incidents of changes in
dispute resolution practices in all the countries we studied. This process
increases the diversity and complexity of institutional arrangements rather
than, as suggested by proponents of the VoC approach, providing for disin-
centives for change (Hall and Soskice 2001: 64).
Yet our findings also contradict the picture of a uniform trend in a neo-
liberal direction toward greater employer discretion through decentralized
IR suggested by Baccaro and Howell (2017). Although we found some com-
monality in the decline of collective dispute resolution subsystems and the
growth of individual regulated ones in all four of our cases, these conflict
resolution subsystems did not always reflect an enhanced employer discre-
tion but rather, especially in the United States, a growing recognition of
individual employee rights. In other cases, such as Italy, these subsystems
maintained a close connection with the collective dimension, since trade
unions are key in assisting individual employees. Moreover, subsystems
based on an individualized, voluntarist model, which would represent the
epitome of a neoliberal movement, were only found to be growing substan-
tially in the United States among the four countries examined.
The results of the four country case studies in this analysis also lead us to
identify a peculiar process of institutional change that closely resembles the
‘‘layering’’ model of institutional change as formulated by Streeck, Thelen,
and Mahoney (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2015). As
they highlighted, we did not find institutional change in conflict resolution
systems occurring through a sharp disjuncture with wholesale replacement
of existing systems, as in the punctuated equilibrium model of institutional
change (Erickson and Kuruvilla 1998); instead, this change took place
incrementally. Unlike other recent contributions highlighting incremental
processes of transformation of existing institutions through conversion—
that is, through changes in their function or mode of operation (Baccaro
and Howell 2017)—we found that institutional change in conflict resolution
is occurring through layering. In our cases, new subsystems gained growing
importance, while older ones showed a declining relevance, even as these
old and new subsystems continued to operate in parallel as components of
the same national system. This process of evolution of the institutional ecol-
ogy has implications for how we think about public policy. It suggests that
rather than focusing just on the older subsystems that have been the
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traditional domain of industrial relations, policy strategies need to encom-
pass the range of newer, expanding subsystems.
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